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Crosstalk 2.0: asylum and communicative 
breakdowns
MARCO JACQUEMET
Abstract
Using ethnographic evidence on asylum proceedings for refugee recognition 
from various sources (Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom, and Canada), this pa-
per updates Gumperz’s notion of crosstalk by exploring the massively flexible 
and multilingual nature of late-modern communication as epitomized in one of 
the most complex adjudication procedures performed by Western nation-states. 
Every year thousands of displaced people seek the protection of various Euro-
pean countries by filing asylum claims, which are examined by national com-
missions. This paper explores how the problematic nature of these encounters 
can be traced to the nature of late-modern communication, characterized as it 
is by asymmetrical power, multiple communicative agents with competing 
agendas, multilingual and hybridized talk, and creolized forms of interaction.
Keywords: Intercultural communication; multilingual institutional talk; 
superdiversity; credibility; asylum seekers; interpreters.
1.	 Introduction
Throughout	his	career,	John	Gumperz’s	preoccupation	with	the	large-scale	so-
ciological	effects	of	small-scale	interactions	has	led	him	to	investigate	the	sur-
face	speech	features	(prosody,	rhythm,	lexicalizations)	by	which	speakers	sig-
nal	and	listeners	interpret	what	their	speech	activity	is;	how	content	must	be	
understood;	 and	how	 sentences	 relate	 to	 each	other.	He	has	 argued	 that	 the	
proper	 interpretation	of	what	 he	has	 labeled	contextualization cues	 requires	
interactants	to	have	intimate	knowledge	of	the	communicative	styles	and	prac-
tices	of	particular	social	networks;	and	that	failure	to	attend	to	the	proper	cues	
leads	to	communication	breakdowns	(Gumperz	1982).
This	focus	on	context-building	strategies	has	given	his	work	an	important	
applied	 perspective.	 Most	 notably,	 he	 collaborated	 with	 BBC	 to	 produce	
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Crosstalk,	a	popular	educational	documentary	on	the	problems	faced	by	indi-
viduals	(mostly	 immigrants)	who	are	unable	 to	use	 the	appropriate	codes	 in	
institutional	encounters	(Gumperz	et	al.	1979).	In	this	piece,	he	suggested	that	
one	of	the	best	ways	to	overcome	prejudice	was	through	raising	communica-
tive	 awareness	 (especially	 that	 of	 institutional	 gatekeepers).	He	pointed	 out	
that	people	speaking	the	same	language	but	having	different	communicative	
backgrounds	(such	as	British	English	speakers	and	South	Asian	English	speak-
ers)	may	 run	 into	 intercultural	 problems	 derived	 from	 the	 different	 cultural	
assumptions,	different	ways	of	structuring	information,	and	different	ways	of	
speaking	they	bring	to	the	interaction.
One	of	the	interactions	he	analyzed	in	Crosstalk	took	place	between	a	Brit-
ish	English	(BE)-speaking	bank	teller	and	a	South	Asian	English	(SAE)	speak-
ing	customer.	Gumperz	used	this	interaction	to	show	how	the	contrast	between	
two	different	ways	of	conveying	meaning	through	prosody	produces	commu-
nicative	misunderstandings	which	can	lead	to	feelings	of	animosity.	He	com-
pared	the	way	in	which	the	SAE-speaking	customer	addressed	a	negative	re-
mark	to	the	teller	for	having	provided	the	wrong	bank	form	with	the	way	in	
which	 a	BE-speaking	 customer	made	 a	very	 similar	 negative	 remark	 to	 the	
same	teller	 for	 the	same	reason.	He	 transcribed	 the	 two	interactions,	paying	
particular	attention	to	prosody:
(1)	 Gumperz	et	al.	(1979:	21)
	 British	English	speaker:	 “oh	no.	this	is	the	wrong	one”
	 	South	Asian	English	speaker:	 “Yes.	No	No.	This	is	the	wrong	one”
Gumperz	noted	 that	 the	BE	customer	stressed	 the	 terminal	word	 in	 the	sen-
tence	(“one”),	enabling	the	two	BE	speakers	to	reach	the	mutual	understanding	
that	they	had	both	experienced	a	mistake	common	in	bureaucratic	settings	and	
to	 correct	 the	mistake	without	 assigning	blame.	He	 explained	 that	 the	SAE	
speaker	used	a	much	more	marked	emphasis,	electing	to	stress	the	accusatory	
word	(“wrong”),	and	that	this	emphasis	was	unexpected	by	the	teller,	who	in-
terpreted	the	remark	to	be	hostile	and	saw	the	SAE	customer	as	being	rude	and	
impertinent.	In	this	interaction,	both	customer	and	teller	blamed	each	other	for	
the	misunderstanding	before	 the	 correct	 bank	 form	was	procured.	Gumperz	
understood	the	animosity	to	be	the	result	of	both	parties’	failure	to	attend	to	the	
proper	contextualization	cues	(in	this	case,	the	prosody).
On	the	basis	of	such	findings,	Gumperz	has	claimed	that	intercultural	com-
municative	misunderstandings	result	when	speakers	pursue	non-checked	com-
municative	strategies	that	are	not	shared	by	their	interlocutors	and	that	reside	
below	the	level	of	awareness.	To	solve	intercultural	breakdowns	he	has	there-
fore	called	for	increasing	the	metacommunicative	awareness	of	all	speakers,	
and	in	particular	of	those	in	positions	of	dominance	(institutional	gatekeepers,	
educators,	examiners,	and	so	on).
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Gumperz’s	 sociolinguistic	 optimism	has	 led	 some	 critics	 to	 fault	 him	 for	
neglecting	 the	power	 technologies	 through	which	elites	guard	access	 to	up-
ward	mobility	 and	 institutions	 resist	 change.	These	 critics	 have	 argued	 that	
awareness	is	only	seldom	used	to	solve	communicative	difficulties	(Pennycook	
[2001:	167]	for	instance	mentions	that	he	is	“skeptical	about	the	notion	that	
awareness	 can	 lead	 to	 emancipation,”	 see	 also	Coupland	et	 al.	 2001;	Eades	
2004).
Even	though	communicative	dominance	did	not	constitute	an	explicit	focus	
of	Gumperz’s	writing,	a	careful	reading	of	his	work	reveals	a	fluid	understand-
ing	of	power	relations,	in	which	power	resides	not	in	opposing	blocks	but	in	
myriad	asymmetrical	everyday	encounters,	which	are	shaped	by	culture-bound	
judgments	carrying	within	them	the	seeds	of	ideological	struggle.	In	this	way	
Gumperz	 seems	 to	have	 listened	 to	Foucault’s	 (1991)	 insistence	 that	power	
needs	to	be	explained	through	a	detailed	analysis	of	discourse:	where	the	com-
municative	analysis	of	the	micro-physics	of	power	would	aim	to	explore	how	
power	may	operate,	rather	than	to	merely	demonstrate	its	existence	(see	also	
Blommaert	2005,	2010;	Codó	2008).
In	 this	context,	current	scholarship	has	 turned	its	attention	to	specific	lin-
guistic	devices	able	to	presuppose	and	create	asymmetrical	encounters,	and	in	
particular	to	those	linked	to	metapragmatic awareness,	that	is,	to	the	aware-
ness	 speakers	have	about	 the	 implications	of	activating	 the	social	meanings	
conveyed	by	speech.	Metapragmatic	awareness	is	shaped	by	a	speaker’s	real-
ization	that	speech	forms	are	used	to	establish	the	indexical	order	between	in-
teractants:	 the	speaker’s	situational	stance	vis-à-vis	 the	interlocutor	(one-up/
one-down);	the	social	relations	or	relative	status	of	the	participants;	and	special	
attributes	of	particular	individuals	(see	Silverstein	1976).	During	interactions	
(especially	 in	 institutional	 settings),	 participants	 tend	 to	be	keenly	aware	of	
the	specific	use	of	signs	used	by	their	interlocutor	(style	of	delivery,	prosody,	
or	underlying	rhetorics).	At	times,	metapragmatic	awareness	may	turn	vicious	
and	manifest	 itself	 in	a	metapragmatic attack:	a	strategy	of	consciously	and	
overtly	 calling	 attention	 to	 and/or	mocking	 the	 other’s	 performance	 for	 the	
purpose	of	interactional	control.	Metapragmatic	attacks	put	an	interlocutor	on	
the	defensive	without	the	speaker	having	to	level	any	specific	accusations	and	
require	the	former	to	address	the	attack	at	the	metapragmatic	level.	Metaprag-
matic	attacks	unravel	the	raw	fabric	of	communicative	interactions,	exposing	
the	interactants’	maneuvers	as	they	struggle	for	control,	respect,	and	interac-
tional	dominance	(Jacquemet	1994,	1996).
In	Crosstalk,	Gumperz	captured	a	metapragmatic	attack	during	the	interac-
tion	between	the	South	Asian	English	speaking	customer	and	the	British	Eng-
lish	speaking	teller.	After	the	exchange	about	the	wrong	bank	form,	the	cus-
tomer	explained	to	the	teller	that	his	account	was	in	a	different	bank:	“I	got	
my	account	in	Wembley.”	The	teller	then	replied,	in	an	irritated	tone,	with	a	
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metapragmatic	attack:	“Why	didn’t	you	say	so	the	first	time?”	An	analysis	of	
this	attack	would	have	pointed	to	the	strained	social	relations	in	post-colonial	
context	of	Indian	migrants	to	the	United	Kingdom,	which	clearly	influenced	
the	interaction,	as	well	as	the	social	and	political	asymmetries	characteristic	of	
this	bureaucratic	setting.1
The	 proper	 context	 to	 understand	 intercultural	 communication	 should	 be	
one	that	looks	at	communication	as	a	contested	field	and	as	a	practice	to	be	
inserted	in	wider	and	long-standing	power	struggles.	Intercultural	communica-
tion	in	this	view	is	less	like	a	cooperative	enterprise	and	more	like	a	battlefield	
interactants	enter	more	or	less	well	equipped	with	cultural	and	sociolinguistic	
resources.	As	such	they	are	acutely	aware	of	language	use	and	of	the	possibility	
to	use	their	resources	for	achieving	a	position	of	interactional	dominance.
In	sum,	in	the	study	of	intercultural	communication	we	must	render	explicit	
a	power-centered	perspective	where	the	linguistic	analysis	of	intercultural	en-
counters	must	be	cross-pollinated	with	an	analysis	of	the	power	technologies	
brought	onto	the	field.	This	is	what	the	remainder	of	this	paper	sets	out	to	do.	
First,	I	will	discuss	the	nature	of	communication	and	power	in	late	modernity	
by	 exploring	 the	 power-saturated	 context	 of	 asylum	proceedings	 (both	 pre-
liminary	interviews	and	formal	hearings),	analyzing	the	role	played	by	techno-
linguistic	devices	(such	as	metapragmatic	attacks)	in	implementing	successful	
talk	 in	 institutional	settings.	Then,	I	will	engage	with	Gumperz’s	 theoretical	
mapping	by	revisiting	the	three	categories	he	identified	at	the	basis	of	intercul-
tural	miscommunication	(cultural	assumptions,	rhetorical	structures,	and	ways	
of	speaking)	through	an	analysis	of	asylum	proceedings.	Finally,	I	will	discuss	
the	multilingual	reality	of	contemporary	institutional	talk,	where	national	ide-
ologies	of	monolingualism	are	increasingly	difficult	to	be	implemented	as	mo-
bility	(human,	cultural,	and	semiotic)	increases.
2.	 Power,	institutional	talk,	and	the	asylum	process
In	all	intercultural	encounters,	participants	must	confront	the	tension	between	
their	expectations	and	resulting	interpretations — a	tension	caused	by	the	com-
monsensical	 urge	 to	 interpret	 the	 other’s	 communicative	 behavior	 based	 on	
one’s	 own	 expectations	 of	what	 is	 appropriate.	 In	Crosstalk,	 Gumperz	 dis-
cusses	the	consequences	of	unmatched	expectations	in	this	light,	warning	Brit-
ish	and	American	English	speakers,	who	are	used	to	a	certain	prosody,	not	to	
take	the	excessive	loudness	on	the	part	of	South	Asian	English	speakers	as	a	
sign	of	contempt	or	rudeness	but	as	a	culturally	appropriate	way	of	speaking	in	
their	speech	community.
When	expectations	are	not	matched	and	interpretations	are	not	kept	in	check,	
communicative	breakdowns	are	more	 likely	 to	occur.	This	situation	 is	com-
pounded	when	the	interactants	do	not	have	equal	power — whether	that	power	
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comes	 from	 interactional	or	 institutional	contexts.	Although	no	 intercultural	
encounter	 should	be	 considered	devoid	of	 power	dynamics,	 there	 is	 a	wide	
spectrum	of	possible	variations	in	the	relative	power	of	interactants,	ranging	
from	the	almost	neutral	meeting	of	two	equal	business	partners	to	the	extremely	
asymmetrical	examination	of	an	asylum	seeker.
In	 order	 to	 develop	 fully	 our	 understanding	 of	 late-modern	 intercultural	
communication,	we	must	center	our	analysis	on	those	intercultural	encounters	
happening	 in	 bureaucratic/institutional	 settings	 between	 state	 officers	 and	
transnational	subjects	(migrants,	asylum	seekers,	expats).	In	these	encounters,	
state	officers	operate	as	mid-level	agents	activating	both	broader	political	and	
ideological	imperatives	as	well	as	locally	based	practical	(but	impersonal)	con-
cerns,	whereas	 the	 (very	personal)	 outcome	of	 the	 interaction	 for	 the	 client	
could	lead	to	access	to	precious	resources	or	to	its	denial,	with	life-changing	
consequences.	To	manage	 these	 encounters,	 nation-states	 (and	 international	
organizations)	have	developed	new	forms	of	professionalism	and	expert	know-
ledge	with	 their	 attendant	 power	 structures,	 extending	 to	mobile	people	 the	
power	 technologies	developed	for	 the	control	and	 regulation	of	 the	national	
citizenry	(Agar	1985;	Drew	and	Heritage	1992;	Sarangi	and	Slembrouck	1996;	
Sarangi	and	Roberts	1999;	Codó	2008).
Faced	 with	 the	 influx	 of	 foreigners	 seeking	 refuge	 and/or	 a	 better	 life,	
	nation-states	have	responded	by	creating	institutional	adjustments	able	to	han-
dle	these	transnational	clients	and	their	multiple	languages.	As	various	scholars	
(Heller	2001;	Moyer	and	Martin	Rójo	2007;	Codó	2008)	point	out,	most	West-
ern	nations	had	to	extend	rights	previously	limited	to	territorially	based	popu-
lations	to	people	who	speak	various	languages	and	come	from	various	foreign	
territories.	Therefore,	 they	set	up	various	programs	for	 the	access	 to	 institu-
tions	(from	bilingual	classrooms,	to	translation	services,	to	asylum	boards)	run	
by	bureaucrats	and	able	to	accommodate	the	various	needs	of	a	migrant	popu-
lation	by	providing	them	with	interpreters,	and	occasionally	with	the	services	
of	counsels,	social	workers,	and	cultural	mediators.	Interpreters	in	particular	
have	come	to	play	a	significant	role	in	the	administration	of	services	during	
institutional	 encounters	 (see	 below,	 and	 Wadensjö	 1998;	 Davidson	 2000;	
	Inghilleri	2003;	Jacquemet	2010;	Angermeyer	2009).
These	adjustments	did	not	 lessen	 the	authority	of	 institutional	agents,	but	
allowed	for	hybrid	forms	of	power	relations,	making	necessary	some	signifi-
cant	changes	in	the	techno-linguistic	devices	activated	during	multilingual	in-
stitutional	encounters.	Among	the	techno-linguistic	devices	most	impacted	by	
immigration	we	want	 to	 focus	 our	 attention	 on	 three,	 interrelated	 ones:	 the	
	examination/interview,	the	entextualization	process,	and	the	use	of	metaprag-
matic practices.	Let	me	briefly	illustrate	these	devices	in	relation	to	the	asylum	
process,	 one	 of	 the	most	 complex	 adjudication	procedures	 in	 contemporary	
Western	bureaucracies	(Good	2007).
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As	Foucault	pointed	out,	the	examination	is	a	particularly	severe	and	effec-
tive	power	technology	set	up	to	provide	institutions	with	a	clear	way	of	observ-
ing,	 recording,	cataloguing,	and	archiving	all	people	subjected	 to	 its	control	
(Rabinow	1984).	In	the	asylum	process,	asylum	seekers	are	probed	and	ques-
tioned	about	their	story	by	bureaucrats	showing	a	particular	virulent	version	of	
the	“ideology	of	mistrust”	found	in	all	institutional	settings	(i.e.,	an	ideology	
where	“assumptions	of	sincerity	hold	differently	for	bureaucrats	and	clients,”	
Sarangi	and	Slembrouck	1996:	48).	Scholars	working	on	asylum	have	spoken	
of	a	“culture	of	suspicion,”	at	times	so	rampant	as	to	derail	the	purpose	of	the	
examination	(Maryns	2006;	Bohmer	and	Shuman	2007;	Jacquemet	2010).	Up	
until	the	late	1970s,	agencies	in	charge	of	asylum	determination	relied	mostly	
on	the	applicant’s	account.	In	the	absence	of	written	evidence,	applicants	were	
prompted	 to	demonstrate	 their	 sincerity	by	means	of	a	detailed	narration	of	
their	stories.	Evidence	provided	directly	by	the	asylum	seeker	was	awarded	a	
high	value	and	was	generally	accepted	at	its	face	value	(Fassin	and	Rechtman	
2009).	 Starting	 in	 the	 1980s,	 however,	more	 restrictive	 policies	were	 intro-
duced	in	almost	all	Western	nations	(the	final	destination	of	most	asylum	cases)	
and	asylum	agencies	felt	the	need	to	reduce	their	reliance	on	the	applicant’s	
testimony.	As	a	result,	asylum	depositions	increasingly	assumed	the	flavor	of	
cross-examinations,	with	asylum	officers	systematically	and	harshly	question-
ing	applicants’	answers,	seeking	to	pinpoint	their	referential	accuracy,	and	at	
times	curtailing	their	stories	altogether	(Jacquemet	2010).
These	 interviews	 are	 usually	 centered	 around	 a	 script,	 produced	 by	 the	
granting	agency	based	on	its	institutional	imperatives.	This	script	is	designed	
to	determine	the	identity	of	the	applicant	(not	a	simple	task,	see	Bohmer	and	
Shuman	2007;	Jacquemet	forthcoming),	reconstruct	the	essential	episodes	of	
the	case,	and	probe	the	applicant’s	grounds	for	asylum,	especially	his	or	her	
fear	of	persecution	(as	mandated	by	the	UN	Human	Rights	Declaration).	By	
appealing	to	the	script,	examiners	can	minimize	responsibility	for	their	ques-
tions,	and	their	underlying	implication	of	mistrust.	To	assess	an	asylum	case,	
officers	now	elicit,	 look	for,	and	rely	on	a	variety	of	references	(person	and	
place	names,	temporal	markers,	body	parts,	etc.)	to	locate	the	asylum	claim	in	
socio-historical	space	and	time	in	order	to	assess	its	accuracy	and	reliability	
(Jacquemet	 forthcoming).	Moreover,	 the	 format	 of	 the	 script	 (especially	 its	
sequential	organization,	see	below)	is	most	of	the	times	at	odds	with	the	asy-
lum	seekers’	understanding	of	the	process	they	are	undergoing.	Expecting	to	
tell	their	stories,	they	are	confronted	with	examiners	who	cut	them	off	at	the	
first	sign	they	are	veering	from	the	script,	in	fact	preventing	them	from	sharing	
their	narratives,	with	at	times	traumatic	consequences	(Jacquemet	2010).
This	process	of	stringent	and	skeptical	questioning	is	exacerbated	by	the	role	
of	 the	interpreters,	who	frequently	assume	stances	most	of	 the	times	shaped	
by	 the	perceived	expectations	of	 the	officials	 in	charge,	which	 lead	 them	to	
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modify	statements,	volunteer	explanations,	and	at	times	antagonize	the	asylum	
seeker	(Berk-Seligson	2000;	Pollabauer	2004;	Jacquemet	2010).
Second,	all	examinations	need	to	enter	the	institutional	record	through	en-
textualization,	the	process	of	rendering	a	single	instance	of	talk	into	text,	de-
tachable	from	its	local	context.	The	entextualization	process	is	one	of	the	most	
powerful	structuring	instruments	used	by	nation-states	to	handle	institutional	
encounters,	process	claims,	and	adjudicate	on	valuable	resources	(Bauman	and	
Briggs	1990;	Silverstein	and	Urban	1996;	Bucholtz	2000;	Bucholtz	and	Park	
2009).	Entextualization	tactics	are	communicative	practices	that	both	produce	
representations	of	the	social	world	in	accord	with	a	given	ideology	and	seek	to	
persuade	others	to	comply	with	these	representations.
It	is	on	the	basis	of	this	entextualization	that	asylum	is	granted,	or	in	case	of	
denial	an	appeal	can	be	launched.	Given	the	complex	nature	of	communication	
in	a	multilingual	environment,	we	could	expect	inaccurate	transcriptions	of	the	
applicant’s	performance	during	the	examination.	Here	again,	public	officials,	
faced	with	 the	 intrinsic	 alterity	 of	 the	 asylum	 seekers’	 talk	 and	 the	 tension	
	between	foreign	performances	and	national	codes,	produce	transcripts	based	
on	commonsensical,	but	at	 times	 inappropriate,	 local	knowledge.	They	pro-
duce	in	other	words	a	public	transcript	based	on	their	cultural	assumptions	and	
institutional	 expectations,	 all	 firmly	 anchored	 by	 dominant	 national	 values	
	(Jacquemet	2009).
Third,	 in	 their	 questioning	 asylum	 officers	 routinely	 use	 metapragmatic 
practices	to	call	attention	to	the	underlying	ideology	of	the	asylum	process.	In	
order	to	do	so,	they	have	to	shift	their	orientation	to	the	multiple	orders	of	in-
dexicality	shaping	the	efficacy	of	these	practices	(Blommaert	2005,	2010).	The	
examination	 of	 an	 asylum	 case	 remains	 a	 site	where	multilingual	 practices	
come	into	conflict	with	national	language	ideologies,	where	nonlocal	conver-
sational	styles	are	indexed	as	inferior,	and	where	applicants	are	routinely	con-
structed	 as	 unreliable.	Through	metapragmatic	 statements,	 state	 bureaucrats	
impose	 dominant	 norms	 and	 forms	 of	 their	 institutional	 culture	 on	 people	
barely	able	to	understand	the	nation’s	local	language,	let	alone	state	officials’	
processes	of	 conducting	 in-depth	 interviews,	writing	 reports,	 and	producing	
the	record	required	in	order	for	institutions	to	grant	them	access	to	resources	
(Eades	 and	Arends	 2004;	 Pollabauer	 2004;	 Maryns	 and	 Blommaert	 2001;	
Blommaert	2009).
Let	me	illustrate	this	point	with	an	example	from	my	fieldwork	in	the	United	
Nations	High	Commission	for	Refugees	(UNHCR)	office	in	Tirana,	Albania,	
immediately	 after	 the	 Kosovo	 war.	 During	 their	 interviews,	 some	 asylum	
	seekers	attempted	 to	use	English	 to	plead	directly	with	 the	UNHCR	officer.	
But	to	no	avail:	they	were	gently	but	firmly	metapragmatically	redirected	to	
the	interpreter	to	be	duly	interviewed	about	their	local	knowledge	of	Kosovo	
(Jacquemet	 2010).	 Speaking	 English	 was	 not	 only	 unnecessary,	 but	 also	
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	subject	 to	backfire:	proper	 refugees	were	not	expected	 to	know	foreign	 lan-
guages.	Demonstrating	too	much	cosmopolitanism	would	have	threatened	an	
applicant’s	eligibility	for	refugee	status,	because	it	undermined,	in	the	eyes	of	
the	UNHCR,	his	or	her	performance	of	authenticity.
In	 such	 a	 hostile	 environment,	 communicative	breakdowns	 (“crosstalks”)	
are	then	attributed	to	the	applicants’	nonconformity	to	the	expectations	of	the	
examiner	and/or	adjudicator,	to	their	inability	to	master	the	institutional	regis-
ter	and	adapt	to	the	script,	and	to	unmatched	pragmatics.	These	communicative	
failures	were	quickly	taken	to	confirm	institutional	expectations	of	deceit.
Unfortunately,	asylum	cases	do	not	come	with	communication	manuals	con-
taining	culturally	and	institutionally	appropriate	 instructions.	They	are	high-
risk	 games	 of	 institutional	 roulette,	 in	which	 the	 granting	 of	 refugee	 status	
or	 its	denial	depends	on	 the	 luck	of	 the	draw:	 the	availability	of	competent	
	interpreters/cultural	mediators	 and	 attentive	 and	well-informed	 adjudicators	
cannot	be	taken	for	granted,	because	they	are	few	and	overstretched	among	a	
plethora	of	suspicious,	uninformed,	and,	at	times,	arrogant	bureaucrats.
3.	 Communicative	breakdowns
One	of	the	most	problematic	issues	in	the	asylum	process	is	the	determination	
of	the	asylum	seeker’s	credibility.	In	making	this	determination,	state	officials	
routinely	rely	on	their	own	indigenous	understanding	of	the	factors	that	estab-
lish	credibility,	an	understanding	that	asylum	seekers	do	not	necessarily	share.	
As	a	result,	the	performances	of	asylum	seekers	are	routinely	framed	by	offi-
cials	as	“difficult”	and	“problematic”	and	are	handled	with	suspicion.
Credibility	is	in	large	part	shaped	by	officials’	expectations	of	narrative	flu-
ency,	a	fact	also	implicitly	acknowledged	by	the	United	Nations	High	Com-
mission	for	Refugees:
(The	interviewer	must)	assess	the	credibility	of	the	person	being	interviewed	by	exami-
ning	the	testimony	for	internal	consistency	(the	coherence	of	the	statement)	and	exter-
nal	consistency	(agreement	with	known	facts).	You	may	also	consider	the	fluency	of	the	
testimony	(that	is,	the	incidence	of	hesitation)	as	well	as	its	clarity	and	detail.	(UNHCR	
1995:	16)
The	suggestion	that	interviewers	pay	attention	to	“fluency”	in	their	determina-
tion	of	credibility	is	derived	from	a	Western	commonsensical	notion	that	story-
telling	should	be	smooth	and	uninterrupted,	preferably	rendered	in	a	coherent	
national	language.	Asylum	seekers,	on	the	other	hand,	may	not	only	have	their	
own	understanding	of	what	constitutes	a	good	verbal	performance,	but	may	
also	utilize	a	massively	flexible	multilingualism — which	is	by	its	very	nature	
broken,	elliptical,	and	scattered.
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Consequently,	 confusion	 and	 lack	 of	 understanding	 (either	 intentional	 or	
not)	 are	 routine	 occurrences	 during	 asylum	 proceedings.	Among	 the	 many	
forms	this	institutional	confusion	can	take,	ethnographic	analysis	in	three	Eu-
ropean	countries,	Italy,	Belgium,	and	the	United	Kingdom,	reveals	three	com-
municative	areas	where	systematic	and	patterned	breakdowns	occur.	Three	of	
these	areas	loosely	match	the	analytical	categories	explored	in	Crosstalk:	cul-
tural assumptions,	semantic maps,	and	ways of speaking.2
In	 the	remainder	of	 this	paper,	 I	will	analyze	 in	detail	some	symptomatic	
cases	of	communicative	breakdowns	attributable	 to	 the	 intercultural,	power-
saturated	nature	of	the	asylum	process.	The	cases	all	come	from	data	collected	
by	different	ethnographers	working	on	asylum:	Inghilleri	(2003),	Good	(2007),	
and	Bohmer	and	Shuman	(2007)	for	the	United	Kingdom,	Maryns	(2006)	for	
Belgium,	and	my	own	fieldwork	for	Italy	(2005–present).	They	have	been	se-
lected	 following	 Llewellyn	 and	 Hoebel’s	 (1941)	 dictum	 that	 situations	 in	
which	a	system	breaks	down	often	yield	the	richest	information	about	the	na-
ture	of	 the	system.	The	extreme — some	could	say	“Monty	Pythonesque” — 	
examples	 discussed	 below	 are	 the	 best	 available	 windows	 into	 the	 asylum	
	proceedings	because	these	communicative	breakdowns	highlight	basic	mech-
anisms	of	these	encounters,	otherwise	obscured	by	taken-for-granted	institu-
tional	routines.
3.1.	 Breakdowns caused by unexpected cultural assumptions
Intercultural	 encounters	 require	 people	 to	 enter	 a	 middle	 ground	 (Holliday	
et	al.	[2004]	call	it	a	“culture	of	dealing”)	where	participants	draw	on	the	spe-
cific	resources	from	their	cultures	of	reference	that	they	believe	instrumental	in	
dealing	with	 the	 cultural	 other.	 Problems	 arise	when	 individual	 participants	
draw	on	cultural	resources	that	are	either	too	alien	(or	considered	as	such)	from	
those	of	other	participants	or	when	the	power	asymmetry	of	the	encounter	al-
lows	the	participant	in	the	dominant	position	to	dismiss	any	need	to	take	into	
account	the	cultural	alterity	of	the	interlocutor.	Although	asylum	seekers	are	
provided	with	 linguistic	 interpreters,	 the	asylum	procedure	does	not	 require	
examining	officers	(or	for	that	matter,	interpreters)	to	be	culturally	fluent	(let	
alone	to	be	empathetic)	in	the	specific	resources	activated	by	the	asylum	seeker	
in	the	encounter.
In	 this	 context,	 Good	 (2007)	 discusses	 how	 UK	 immigration	 officers	 in	
many	 instances	 lack	 the	knowledge	necessary	 to	understand	 the	cultural	 re-
sources	of	the	claimants,	such	as	complex	kinship	arrangements.	He	mentions	
the	hearing	of	a	Bengali	woman,	during	which	 the	Home	Office	Presenting	
Officer	(HOPO)	attempted	to	use	discrepancies	between	her	testimony	and	her	
husband’s	 testimony	to	 invalidate	her	credibility.	Immediately	following	her	
husband’s	interview,	where	he	had	stated	that	their	marriage	had	been	arranged	
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by	his	grandfather,	she	was	also	asked	about	the	marriage.	She	said	that	her	
grandfather	had	suggested	the	marriage.	The	officer	pounced	on	this	claim:
(2)	 Immigration	Appellate	Court,	Glasgow	(Good	2007:	179)
	 	AS	=	woman,	 Bengali;	 I	=	Bengali,	 O	=	British	 English	 (Home	 Office	
Presenting	Officer,	HOPO);	J	=	British	English	(Adjudicator)
1	 HOPO:	 He	says	that	his	grandfather	suggested	the	marriage!
2	 AS:	 My	grandfather	did,	yes.
3	 HOPO:	 (eagerly)	His	or	yours?
4	 Adju:	 Mr.	M,	they	are	cousins;	they	have	the	same	grandfather.
Good	(2007:	179)	concludes:	“The	HOPO	looked	utterly	baffled,	but	got	the	
message	that	for	reasons	unclear	to	him	the	adjudicator	was	not	impressed	by	
this	major	‘discrepancy’	he	had	unearthed.”	We	can	well	imagine	a	situation	
where	an	adjudicator	not	so	familiar	with	South	Asian	cross-cousin	marriage	
patterns	would	have	been	misled	by	the	apparent	discrepancy,	with	dire	conse-
quences	for	the	asylum	seeker’s	credibility.	In	a	similar	vein,	Good	also	dis-
cusses	how	the	Tamil	pattern	of	addressing	both	brothers	and	first	cousins	as	
“brothers”	 causes	 innumerable	 problems	 during	 asylum	 examinations	 (see	
	below,	3.2).
Another	area	in	which	asylum	seekers	frequently	fail	to	conform	to	the	ex-
pectations	of	the	examiners	is	when	the	latter	demand	proper	identification	of	
the	characters	emerging	from	the	testimony.	Knowledge	of	proper	names	(per-
sonal	and	place	names)	in	particular	is	deemed	by	examiners	to	be	essential	in	
establishing	the	credibility	of	a	story.	This	Western/ bureaucratic	focus	on	be-
ing	able	to	provide	consistent	personal	names	was	in	the	foreground	during	a	
Belgian	examination	of	an	asylum	seeker	(AS)	from	Cameroon	analyzed	by	
Maryns	(2006).	The	final	report	is	chock-full	of	passages	where	the	rapporteur	
mentions	the	fact	that	the	asylum	seeker	does	not	know	the	names	of	the	people	
evoked	in	his	story:
(3)	 Belgian	Asylum	Courts	(Maryns	2006:	152–153);	my	italics
	 	AS	spent	a	lot	of	time	there	[secret	gendarmerie’s	prison],	was	tortured,	
didn’t	see	his	family.	Until	somebody	died	(AS does not know his name).	
He	was	in	the	same	cell	as	AS.	In	july	2000	he	was	transferred	to	the	army	
hospital	[	.	.	.	]	One	day,	a	boy	came	to	give	food	to	a	patient	of	him.	Be-
fore	that,	a	nurse	had	warned	him	already	that	he	should	escape	but	AS	
said	that	he	did	not	have	the	strength	to	do	so.	When	that	boy	came	(AS 
does not know his name, NW 4060B),	he	told	him	to	go	to	his	work	place,	
to	Pete,	for	AS’s	driving	license	and	not	to	tell	this	to	anyone.	[	.	.	.	]	AS	
was	 there	 [in	 the	army	hospital]	until	March	2001,	 then	a	brother	of	a	
police	commissioner	was	brought	in.	The	very	same	day	the	commissary	
came	with	a	higher	official	(AS does not know names of any of them),	he	
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said	that	brother	had	to	be	released	and	some	of	the	arrested	were	trans-
ferred	to	hospital.
This	man’s	asylum	claim	was	denied	because	of	his	perceived	lack	of	credibil-
ity.	In	the	final	decision	the	commission	cited,	among	other	factors,	the	appli-
cant’s	lack	of	knowledge	of	personal	names,	which	was	seen	as	proof	of	the	
unreliability	of	his	deposition:
(4)	 Belgian	Asylum	Courts	(Maryns	2006:	161)
	 	These	declarations	 further	 undermine	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 asylum	ac-
count	of	the	person	concerned.	It	is	little	acceptable	that	the	person	con-
cerned	does	not	know	the	name	of	the	boy	who	died	and	who	was	locked	
up	 in	 the	 same	 cell	 as	 the	 person	 concerned	 (cf.	 interrogation	 report	
CGVS,	p.	6).	It	is	striking	that	the	person	concerned	does	not	know	the	
name	of	the	brother	of	the	police	commissioner,	who	was	brought	into	
the	cell	of	the	person	concerned,	the	police	commissionary	himself	and	
the	higher	officer	who	came	to	release	him.
The	commission’s	judgment	shows	complete	lack	of	self-consciousness	about	
Western	bureaucrats’	taken-for-granted	habit	of	establishing	credibility	based	
on	the	applicant’s	ability	to	provide	proper	(i.e.,	verifiable	and	objective)	iden-
tification.	However,	 knowledge	 of	 personal	 names	 is	 highly	 variable	 across	
cultures:	while	Western	institutions	are	obsessed	with	unequivocal	identifica-
tion,	non-Western	cultures	are	not	so	inclined.	Some	prefer	kin	terms	in	refer-
ring	to	people	(Hanks	2003),	others	discourage	sharing	personal	names	with	
strangers	(for	instance,	the	Tuareg	studied	by	Youssouf	et	al.	1976),	or	prefer	
nicknames	or	generic	names	(Jacquemet	1992).	Calame-Griaule	(1986),	in	her	
ethnography	 of	 the	 Dogon,	 a	 population	 living	 in	 Burkina	 Faso	 and	Mali,	
pointed	 out	 the	 complex	 patronymic	 system	 in	 place	 in	 this	 culture,	where	
	different	 names	 (from	personal	 to	 taboo)	 are	 used	 in	 different	 contexts	 and	
situations.
Problems	arise	when	individual	participants	draw	on	cultural	resources	that	
are	either	too	alien	(or	considered	as	such)	from	those	of	other	participants	or	
when	the	power	asymmetry	of	the	encounter	allows	the	participant	in	the	dom-
inant	position	to	dismiss	any	need	to	take	into	account	the	cultural	alterity	of	
the	interlocutor.
This	lack	of	cultural	awareness	was	also	extended	to	place	names,	given	that	
toponyms	are	also	culturally	produced	fact,	and	the	decision	on	which	topo-
graphical	features	deserve	names	must	be	considered	on	a	culture	by	culture	
basis	(for	a	rich	ethnography	of	place	names,	see	Basso	1996;	on	toponyms	
during	asylum	proceedings,	see	Jacquemet	forthcoming).	Again	Maryns	(2006)	
discusses	a	case	where	credibility	of	the	applicant	was	questioned	based	on	her	
inability	to	provide	a	name	for	the	street	on	which	she	lived:
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(5)	 Belgian	Asylum	Courts	(Maryns	2006:	299)
	 	AS	=	woman,	Sierra	Leone,	prob.	Njala;	O	=	woman,	Belgian
O:	 ok.	.	.	your	address	in	Sierra	Leone
AS:	 Puba
O:	 Puba.	.	.	no	street	name
AS:	 Puba
O:	 that	is	the	city	hen.	.	.	Puba
AS:	 xxxxxxxx
O:	 what	is	it.	.	.
AS:	 I	don’t	understand.	.	.	that
O:	 Puba.	.	.	is	the	city	or	the	village?
AS:	 it’s	a	VILLAge
O:	 yes.	.	.	and	the	name	of	the	street.	.	.
AS:	 what?
O:	 name	of	the	street
AS:	 Puba
O:	 ALSO	Puba?
AS:	 the	name	of	the	street
O:	 yes.	.	.	your	street	has	no	name
Coming	from	a	census-based,	large-scale	society,	asylum	officers	very	often	do	
not	easily	relate	to	applicants’	topographical	universe,	such	as	the	Puba	village	
in	Sierra	Leone	where	streets	have	no	names	or,	as	in	the	following	case,	where	
one	does	not	need	to	know	the	address	of	a	building	to	be	able	to	get	there:
(6)	 Immigration	Appellate	Court,	Glasgow	(Good	2007:	163)
	 AS	=	Kurd;	I	=	Kurd;	O	=	British	English;	J	=	British	English
O:	 	According	to	your	statement	and	your	interview,	you	actually	attended	
the	HADEP	building,	but	you	didn’t	know	the	address	of	it.	Why	would	
it	be?
I:	 xxx
AS:	 xxx
I:	 	There	was	a	party	building	in	N---.	I	knew	the	building,	I	knew	where	I	
was,
	 I	didn’t	have	to	know	address.	It’s	like	in	this	country,
	 I	know	where	my	friend	lives,	I	don’t	have	to	know	his	address.
In	this	case,	the	quick-thinking	applicant	offered	a	rationale	for	the	construc-
tion	of	a	parallel	universe	in	which	people	can	navigate	without	toponyms.3
To	conclude	this	section	I	want	to	mention	the	case,	reported	by	Bohmer	and	
Shuman	(2007),	of	a	US	judge	who	found	an	asylum	seeker’s	story	noncredi-
ble	 because	 the	 applicant	 had	 said	 his	 brother	was	 in	 a	 prison	 hospital	 but	
he	did	not	know	the	name	of	the	hospital.	They	noted	that	this	was	a	case	of	
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different	cultural	assumptions:	“in	Afghanistan	the	name	of	a	hospital	is	not	
common	knowledge	as	it	 is	in	the	US”	(2007:	156).	Lack	of	shared	cultural	
assumptions	produced	in	this	case	a	culture	of	suspicion	with	negative	implica-
tions	for	the	applicant’s	human	rights.
3.2.	 Breakdowns caused by unexpected semantic clusters
Claim	denials	can	also	arise	from	reasons	related	to	semantic	clusters	of	indig-
enous	classifications,	which	do	not	map	onto	those	of	the	dominant	language	
of	the	hearing.	For	instance,	Good	(2007)	discusses	a	case	involving	a	discrep-
ancy	between	kin	terminology	in	Tamil	and	in	English.	Everyday	Tamil	has	no	
composite	term	for	brother,	only	the	terms	annan (‘elder	brother’,	‘senior	par-
allel	cousin’)	and	 tampi	 (‘younger	brother’,	 ‘junior	parallel	cousin’).	 In	 this	
particular	hearing,	the	asylum	seeker	was	asked	about	his	siblings	and	whether	
any	of	them	were	active	militants.	He	replied	that	he	had	one	annan and	one	
tampi,	which	was	 translated	by	 the	 interpreter	as	“he	has	 two	brothers.”	He	
then	proceeded	to	discuss	them	separately,	focusing	first	on	his	tampi’s	mili-
tantism,	 which	 was	 then	 translated	 as	 “his	 militant	 brother.”	According	 to	
Good	(2007:	180),	due	 to	 the	“characteristic	eagerness	of	 the	caseworker	 to	
press	on,”	the	asylum	seeker	was	not	allowed	to	complete	his	testimony	and	
to	clarify	that	also	his	annan	had	joined	the	Tamil	Tigers.	As	a	result,	the	mili-
tancy	of	this	second	“brother”	remained	in	the	wings,	only	to	resurface	during	
a	second	hearing	to	sow	doubt	into	the	mind	of	the	adjudicators.
In	an	expansion	of	Berg-Seligson’s	(1990)	model	for	examining	interpreting	
in	 the	 courtroom,	 Inghilleri	 (2003)	 focused	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	 polysemic	
statements	to	monosemic	statements	in	the	transfer	from	the	source	language	
to	the	official	language	in	asylum	hearings	in	the	United	Kingdom.	In	her	anal-
ysis	of	the	case	of	a	Central	American	asylum	seeker,	she	discussed	how	the	
semantic	 ambiguities	 of	 the	 Spanish	word	 fracaso	were	 lost	 in	 the	 transfer	
from	the	asylum	seeker’s	deposition	in	Spanish	to	the	interpretation	in	English.	
In	the	regional	variety	of	Spanish	spoken	in	Central	America,	this	term	is	used	
in	two	radically	different	contexts:	it	can	refer	to	economic	or	financial	failure	
as	well	as	to	physical	harm	and	structural	body	failure	(including	torture).	In	
this	case,	the	interpretation	of	the	term	became	a	crucial	element	for	officials	
examining	 the	 applicant’s	motives	 for	 escaping	 from	 his	 Central	American	
home.	The	applicant	had	explained	that	he	fled	because	of	fear	of	fracaso.	The	
interpreter	translated	this	as	fear	of	economic	failure,	and	the	applicant’s	state-
ment	was	recorded	as	such.	In	a	series	of	successive	judgments,	bureaucrats	of	
the	Home	Office	relied	upon	this	entextualization	to	deny	the	asylum	applica-
tion	on	the	grounds	that	the	applicant	was	an	“economic	migrant”	rather	than	a	
“political	refugee”	(a	recurrent	political	 theme	in	Western	attitudes	vis-à-vis	
asylum	seekers,	one	shaped	by	decades	of	cold	war	ideology.4
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Confusion	over	calendars	can	also	lead	to	serious	consequences	for	the	asy-
lum	seeker,	especially	in	cases	where	non-Gregorian	dates	(such	as	those	of	a	
lunar	calendar)	do	not	align	with	Gregorian	dates.	This	is	quite	convincingly	
illustrated	in	the	following	case,	where	a	poor	match	between	the	Western	cal-
endar	and	the	Tamil	“luni-solar	calendar”	caused	a	loss	of	applicant’s	credibility:
(7)	 Immigration	Appellate	Court,	Glasgow	(Good	2007:	173)
	 xxx	marks	untranscribed	text
	 AS	=	Tamil;	I	=	Tamil;	O	=	British	English
O:	 when	did	you	arrive	in	Colombo?
I:	 xxx
AS:	 xxx
I:	 twenty-first	September	Ninety	Nine
O:	 	in	your	 interview,	page	A4,	you	say	you	went	 to	Colombo	 in	August	
Ninety	Nine?
I:	 xxx
AS:	 xxx
I:	 I	went	in	August
O:	 remember	the	date	in	August?
I:	 xxx
AS:	 xxx
I:	 twenty	first
O:	 so,	twenty	first	August	Ninety	Nine
	 	[long	 dialogue	 between	AS	 and	 I	 involving	 use	 of	 names	 of	 various	
Tamil	months]
I:	 I	went	on	twenty	first	September	Ninety	Nine
O:	 You	just	said	you	went	in	August.
I:	 xxx
AS:	 xxx
I:	 I	went	in	September
O:	 so	can	you	explain	why	in	your	interview	you	said	you	went	in	August?
I:	 xxx
AS:	 xxx
I:	 must	have	forgotten,	was	frightened	for	my	life,
	 so	must	have	given	wrong	date.
Although	the	applicant	himself	can	only	suggest	his	precarious	psychological	
state	as	the	reason	for	his	confusion	between	August	and	September,	Good	has	
a	much	more	convincing	explanation:
Months	in	the	Tamil	luni-solar	calendar	are	out	of	phase	with	those	of	the	Gregorian	
calendar.	 Thus	 the	 Tamil	 month	 of	 Avani	 begins	 in	 mid-August	 and	 ends	 in	 mid-
September,	although	the	exact	dates	differ	each	year.	It	only	takes	the	Home	Office	in-
terpreter	to	render	Avani	as	“August”	at	the	asylum	interview,	and	the	court	interpreter	
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to	translate	it	as	“September”	during	the	hearing,	and	the	HOPO	can	triumphantly	pro-
vide	the	court	with	a	credibility-damaging	“discrepancy,”	though	there	may	have	been	
no	inconsistency	whatever	on	the	part	of	the	hapless	appellant.	(Good	2007:	173)
Lack	of	cultural	awareness	about	different	ways	of	keeping	time	can	have	a	
direct	impact	on	referential	accuracy	(in	this	case,	both	internal	and	external),	
with	serious	consequences	for	the	applicant.
Asylum	agencies	routinely	elicit	reference	to	body	parts	to	determine	cred-
ibility,	since	most	asylum	procedures	rely	also	on	medical	reports	to	prove	a	
link	 between	 the	 applicant’s	 narrative	 of	 past	 abuses	 and	 the	 body	 present	
at	 the	 deposition.	Most	 authors	 noted	 that	many	 cases	 hinged	 on	 issues	 of	
	scarring,	 since	agencies	believe	 that	 the	credibility	of	an	applicant	could	be	
directly	 proven	 by	 matching	 his/ her	 story	 with	 the	 referential	 presence	 of	
bodily	scars.	Given	the	inherent	suspicion	about	asylum	claims	on	the	officers,	
the	 applicants’	 narratives	 were	 systematically	 questioned	 for	 corroborating	
evidence	and,	as	Fassin	and	Rechtman	put	 it,	“their	bodies	were	summoned	
to	 testify”	 (2009:	257;	 see	 also	Fassin	 and	d’Halluin	2005	and	2007;	Good	
2007).
However,	 the	 representation	 of	 the	 body	 is	 also	 culturally	mediated,	 and	
this	could	 lead	 to	misunderstood	semantic	clusters.	Discrepancies	may	arise	
when	 comparing	 applicants’	 reference	 to	body	parts	with	 reference	 to	 scars	
on	their	bodies	as	reported	by	medical	examiners	or	observed	during	the	depo-
sition	 by	 adjudicators.	 For	 instance,	Good	 (2007)	 reports	 a	 case	 of	 adverse	
credibility	of	a	Tamil	applicant	based	on	discrepancies	regarding	the	location	
of	 bayonet	 wounds.	 Good’s	 discussion	 focuses	 on	 the	 everyday	 use	 of	 the	
Tamil	term	kal	to	refer	to	both	foot	and	leg,	with	people	specifying	more	pre-
cisely	 between	 kanukkal	 ‘ankle’,	 kutikal	 ‘heel’,	 and	mulankal	 ‘knee’,	 only	
when	 strictly	 necessary.	 He	 speculates	 that	 this	 case	 of	 adverse	 credibility	
could	have	been	“the	artifact	of	translation	choices	made	by	different	interpret-
ers	 on	 separate	 occasions”	 (2007:	 181) — choices	 that	 produced	misaligned	
body	maps.
In	all	these	cases,	the	semantic	transfer	of	applicants’	testimonies	into	Eng-
lish	could	not	accommodate	the	semantic	maps	of	the	original	language.	Be-
cause	of	various	forms	of	constraints	in	the	hearing	(institutional,	interpreta-
tional,	and	temporal),	these	different	semantic	territories	were	left	unexplored.	
Nevertheless	 they	 played	 a	 role	 in	 damaging	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 asylum	
seeker — here	again	with	dire	consequences.
3.3.	 Breakdowns caused by unexpected ways of speaking
The	 third	and	most	common	area	of	communicative	breakdowns	 is	 situated	
at	 the	 surface	 level	 of	 the	 utterance.	Crosstalk has	 already	 highlighted	 the	
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role	of	prosody	in	conveying	both	information	and	attitudinal	stance,	but	by	
looking	 at	 intercultural	 encounters	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 transidiomatic	
	communication	we	can	add	both	a	power-focused	and	xenoglossic	perspective	
(Pennycook	2007).
Let	 us	 look	 at	 another	 case	 studied	 by	Maryns	 (2006),	 in	which	we	 can	
clearly	see	 the	fuzzy,	hybridized	nature	of	 late-modern	communication.	The	
officer	and	the	asylum	seeker	 in	 this	case	were	not	only	driven	by	radically	
different	power	positions	and	motivations	(the	asylum	seeker	needing	to	tell	
her	story,	the	officer	seeking	incontrovertible	evidence	that	could	be	checked	
and	cross-examined)	but	also	used	a	lingua franca	(English	in	this	case)	with	
which	they	were	both	uncomfortable.	In	 the	example	below,	 the	officer	was	
French	Belgian,	while	the	asylum	seeker	was	from	Darfur:
(8)	 Belgian	Asylum	Courts	(Maryns	2006:	285–286)
	 AS	=	woman,	Sudanese	(prob.	Fur);	O	=	woman,	Belgian
1	 O:	 I	gonna	start	with	the	story
	 	 [	.	.	]
2	 	 so	what	happened	to	you	in	Sudan
3	 	 that	you	have	to	leave	the	country
	 	 [	.	.	]
4	 AS:	 don’t-	when	they	are	fighting	we	run
5	 O:	 you	just	run	away	uhum
6	 	 and	what	happened	to	you
7	 	 run	away.	.	.	so	where	to
8	 AS:	 one	man.	.	.	one	man.	.	.	carry	me,	help	me.	.	.
9	 O:	 Karimi
10	 AS:	 yeah
11	 O:	 it	was	a	man	or	a	woman?
12	 AS:	 man
Unfamiliarity	with	different	ways	of	pronouncing	English	words,	 combined	
with	the	official’s	need	for	concrete	evidence	in	the	form	of	a	name,	produced	
a	classic	transidiomatic	communicative	breakdown:	the	asylum	seeker’s	men-
tion	of	a	person	who	“carry	me”	(line	38)	became	the	personal	name	“Karimi.”	
To	compound	the	mistake,	the	claimant	seemed	to	confirm	the	name	suggested	
by	the	official	(line	40) — a	common	instance	of	gratuitous	concurrence	in	an	
institutional	setting,	whereby	the	claimant’s	preferred	second	pair-part	is	usu-
ally	in	agreement	with	the	first	pair-part,	spoken	in	this	case	by	the	official	(see	
Eades	2004).	Later	on,	the	asylum	seeker	was	asked	to	provide	more	informa-
tion	about	Karimi.	She	obviously	could	not	comply	with	the	request	since	she	
did	 not	 understand	 to	whom	 the	 officer	was	 referring.	This	 communicative	
breakdown	had	the	predictable	result	of	undermining	her	credibility	and	her	
claim	was	also	denied	(Maryns	2006:	291).
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Moreover,	 the	difficulty	of	communicating	during	institutional	encounters	
that	involve	different	ways	of	speaking	is	compounded	in	many	cases	by	the	
use	of	 interpreters.	Faced	with	 the	necessity	 to	process	asylum	claims	 from	
all	over	the	world,	public	officers	increasingly	rely	on	professional	linguistic	
passeurs — the	 interpreters — to	 help	 them	 cross	 the	 treacherous	 boundaries	
between	languages.	Yet	almost	all	asylum	agencies	(the	exception	being	the	
Swiss	one,	see	Michaud	2007)	face	serious	financial	limitations,	which	restrict	
the	number	of	languages	for	which	interpreters	can	be	provided	as	well	as	in-
terpreters’	skill	levels.
In	Italian	asylum	hearings,	it	is	not	uncommon	to	find	individual	interpreters	
providing	 translation	 from	 two	 or	 three	 languages,	 including	 languages	 of	
which	they	were	not	native	speakers.	In	the	example	below,	a	Serbian	inter-
preter	was	asked	to	translate	for	an	asylum	seeker	from	Sierra	Leone.	Because	
no	 interpreter	 was	 available	 who	 spoke	 his	 native	 language,	 the	 asylum	
seeker	had	 to	provide	his	 testimony	 in	French.	The	 interpreter,	on	 the	other	
hand,	was	initially	hired	to	translate	for	asylum	seekers	from	former	Yugosla-
via,	 but	 over	 time	 was	 also	 asked	 to	 translate	 from	 French,	 to	 reduce	 the	
number	of	 interpreters	necessary	 to	cover	a	 full	day	of	hearings	 (the	 Italian	
commission	on	asylum	in	Rome	would	typically	handle	eight	 to	 ten	cases	a	
day).	The	coming	together	of	two	non-native	French	speakers	with	very	dif-
ferent	socioeconomic	and	cultural	backgrounds	produced	a	situation	ripe	for	
serious	misunderstanding.	 In	 the	 excerpt	 below,	 the	 interpreter	had	 just	fin-
ished	telling	a	very	credible	story	of	violence	in	which	all	his	family	members	
were	killed	and	the	family	farm	was	burned	to	the	ground.	The	officer	decided	
to	close	 the	hearing	with	 the	 scripted	final	question	about	“fear	of	persecu-
tion”	in	his	country	of	citizenship.5	Due,	however,	to	the	interpreter’s	pronun-
ciation,	the	asylum	seeker	understood	that	they	were	asking	him	if	he	had	a	
father	in	his	home	country	(this	after	he	had	just	testified	about	the	murder	of	
his	father):
(9)	 Italian	Asylum	Hearings	(12	July	2008)
1	 O:	 avete paura
2	 	 di tornare al vostro paese?
3	 I:	 de quoi avez-vous p[œ/ɛ]r?
4	 AS:	 de quoi?
5	 I:	 avez-vous p[œ/ɛ]r au pays?
6	 AS:	 no, je n’ai pas de père
7	 O:	 ma come?
8	 	 (.	.	.)
9	 I:	 quelle est votre p[œ/ɛ]r?
10	 AS:	 je n’ai pas de père
11	 I:	 lui non ha piủ padre
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12	 O:	 non capisco
13	 	 (.	.	.)
14	 	 [intervention	of	the	researcher	to	explain	the	confusion]
1	 O:	 are	you	afraid
2	 	 to	go	back	to	your	country?
3	 I:	 what	are	you	afraid/father	of ?
4	 AS:	 what?
5	 I:	 are	you	afraid/ have	you	a	father	in	your	country?
6	 AS:	 no,	I	don’t	have	a	father
7	 O:	 WHAT?
8	 	 (.	.	.)
9	 I:	 what’s	your	fear/father?
10	 AS:	 I	don’t	have	a	father
11	 I:	 he	doesn’t	have	a	father	anymore
12	 O:	 I	don’t	understand
13	 	 (.	.	.)
14	 	 [intervention	of	the	researcher	to	explain	the	confusion]
The	communicative	breakdown	here	was	caused	by	the	interference	of	Serbian	
and	 French	 phonetics,	 since	 the	 interpreter	 spoke	 French	 with	 a	 Serbian-
inflected	pronunciation.	In	this	case,	the	interpreter	showed	phonetic	interfer-
ence	in	the	pronunciation	of	peur	(‘fear’)	which	came	to	resemble	the	word	
père	 (‘father’).	 The	 Serbian	 phonetic	 system	 has	 no	 front	 rounded	 vowels,	
whereas	French	has	several	front	rounded	vowels	(including	<ε>	as	in	père).	
As	a	result,	the	asylum	seeker	interpreted	the	less-rounded	[œ]	as	unrounded	
[<ε>],	that	is,	he	understood	père	instead	of	peur.	As	it	happens	with	phonetic	
processing	 (and	 in	 experiments),	 the	 asylum	seeker	perceived	 the	 rounded–
unrounded	continuum	in	discrete	terms:	“unroundedness”	<ε>	started	some-
where	where	“roundedness”	ended.	This	could	be	expressed	in	Figure	1.6
If	it	were	not	for	the	intervention	of	this	author	(who	was	observing	and	re-
cording	the	proceedings),	the	contradiction	and	utter	confusion	visible	in	the	
transcript	could	have	 led	 to	a	 loss	of	credibility	 for	 the	asylum	seeker,	with	
negative	repercussions	for	his	claim.
Figure	1.	 Perception and phonetic interferences in [œ] vs. [ɛ]
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4.	 Conclusions
Anybody	familiar	with	John	Gumperz’s	work	will	recognize	that	the	discus-
sion	 above	 owes	 a	 great	 deal	 to	 the	 formulation	 of	 crosstalk	 problems	 by	
Gumperz	et	al.	(1979).	For	Gumperz,	the	problems	were	the	result	of	the	clash	
of	“different	cultural	assumptions,	different	ways	of	structuring	information,	
and	different	ways	of	speaking”	(1979:	4 –5).	In	the	present	discussion	I	have,	
however,	 elected	 to	 remove	 the	 qualifier	 “different”	 from	Gumperz’s	 three	
main	concepts	as	explored	in	this	paper	and	replaced	it	with	“unexpected.”
I	believe	that	we	need	to	consider	asylum	hearings	through	a	paradigm	that	
goes	beyond	the	dominance/difference	divide.	In	the	power-saturated	environ-
ment	of	these	hearings,	we	are	not	dealing	with	intercultural	interactions	be-
tween	equal	partners	holding	“different	cultural	assumptions,”	etc.	(as	we	can	
find	in	an	international	business	meeting),	but	with	clearly	asymmetrical	en-
counters,	in	which	one	side	seeks	help	and	provides	personal	information	and	
the	other	listens	and	adjudicates.
In	this	context,	the	burden	of	potential	misunderstanding	has	dramatic	con-
sequences	only	for	the	asylum	seekers.	Consequently	they	are	the	ones	who	
need	to	adjust	their	conversational	style,	or	face	the	consequences	of	their	in-
ability	to	do	so.	On	the	other	side,	examiners	and	adjudicators	are	using	the	
communicative	power	of	their	techno-linguistic	devices	(questioning,	proce-
dural	objections,	metapragmatic	requests,	and	so	on)	to	ensure	that	the	asylum	
hearings	reflect	the	wishes	of	the	dominant	class.
At	the	same	time,	we	should	avoid	a	deterministic	understanding	of	power	
relations,	opposing	people	with	power	against	 those	without	it.	Any	interac-
tions,	including	the	institutional	proceedings	discussed	above,	still	have	to	be	
accomplished	through	the	turn-by-turn	organization	of	the	performance.	Even	
participants	in	a	weaker	structural	position	may	use	their	superior	communica-
tive	skills	to	bring	about	a	favorable	outcome.
Even	 though	 Gumperz,	 throughout	 his	 career,	 privileged	 the	 “difference	
pole,”	 he	was	 always	 very	 aware	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 performative	
force	and	power	relations,	and	he	recognized	that	any	interactions,	including	
asymmetrical	encounters,	are	shaped	by	culture-bound	performances	carrying	
within	them	the	seeds	of	ideological	struggle,	and	thus	social	change.
At	the	same	time,	I	believe	there	is	a	marked	difference	between	the	materi-
als	 analyzed	 by	 Gumperz	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 current	 scholarship	 on	 asylum	
	proceedings	(Maryns	2006;	Blommaert	2005,	2009;	Codó	2008;	Bohmer	and	
Shuman	2007;	Jacquemet	2009,	forthcoming).	Late-modern	communication	as	
experienced	in	these	proceedings	is	no	longer	embedded	in	a	single	dominant	
language	relating	to	a	strong	minority	language,	but	in	the	multilingual	prac-
tices	 that	 arise	with	global	 cultural	flows	 and	 their	 power	 relations.	We	are	
witnessing	 a	 more	 complex	 kind	 of	 diversity	 that	 the	 one	 encounter	 by	
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Gumperz,	where	the	origin	of	people,	their	presumed	motives	for	migration,	
their	“career”	as	migrants	(sedentary	versus	short-term	and	transitory),	or	their	
sociocultural	and	linguistic	features	cannot	be	presupposed — we	have	entered,	
in	 the	words	of	 sociologist	Steve	Vertovec	 (2007),	 a	 “super-diverse”	world.	
The	comfort	of	the	old	migration	studies,	where	the	people,	their	trajectories,	
and	their	lives	were	known,	has	disappeared,	and	we	are	facing	a	form	of	com-
plexity	that	is	currently	barely	understood.	Practically,	this	raises	critical	ques-
tions	about	the	capacity	of	bureaucracies	to	handle	these	very	diverse	groups	
of	people,	and	in	particular	about	the	ability	of	asylum	agencies	to	handle	their	
proceedings	successfully	(a	process,	I	hoped	to	have	shown,	in	which	language	
issues	play	a	critical	role).
Participants	in	such	proceedings	need	to	consider	that	a	successful	outcome	
is	more	and	more	determined	by	their	ability	to	attend	precisely	to	the	flexible,	
fuzzy,	and	massively	multilingual	nature	of	these	institutional	encounters.	In	
other	words,	they	need	to	realize	the	differential	power	and	linguistic	skills	of	
all	participants,	the	ideological	play	among	languages,	and	the	asymmetrically	
distributed	ability	to	tiptoe	through	the	different	frames	of	an	increasingly	hy-
bridized	institutional	talk.
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Notes
1.	 The	conscious	and	overt	monitoring	of	language	use	for	the	purpose	of	interactional	domi-
nance	is	ingrained	in	the	history	of	contacts	between	British	colonizers	and	Asian	colonized.	
As	Cohn	(1996)	pointed	out	in	his	discussion	of	language	manuals	for	colonial	administrators,	
this	 practice	 of	 linguistic	 consciousness	was	 recognized	 as	 crucial	 for	 the	maintenance	 of	
symbolic	dominance	by	administrators	of	the	British	Empire.	Language	manuals	for	the	colo-
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nists	tried	to	enhance	linguistic	awareness	by	giving	instruction	on	how	to	recognize	“imper-
tinent”	 talk,	 that	 is,	 language	 used	 as	 indicator	 of	 disrespect.	 For	 instance,	 colonists	were	
trained	to	recognize	the	social	 indexicality	of	pronominal	forms	and	in	particular	to	recog-
nized	the	T-form	“too/tera”	as	an	impertinent	form	of	address:	“It’s	rather	surprising	that	ser-
vants	and	sipahees,	etc.	should	be	allowed	to	take	such	advantage	of	their	master’s	ignorance	
of	the	language	and	customs	of	the	country,	as	to	too	and	tera	them	on	every	occasion:	a	lib-
erty	they	dare	not	take	with	one	another”	(Gilchrist,	East India Guide,	as	quoted	in	Cohn	1996:	
43).
2.	 In	Crosstalk,	Gumperz	(et	al.	1979:	4)	spoke	of	“different	cultural	assumptions,	different	ways	
of	structuring	information	and	arguments,	and	different	ways	of	speaking.”
3.	 This	is	a	particularly	common	practice	among	migrants:	in	his	book	on	undocumented	mi-
grants	to	the	United	States,	Conover	(1987)	comments — obviously	impressed — on	the	ability	
of	a	family	of	Mexican	farm	workers	to	travel	from	Northern	Oregon	to	Florida	without	maps,	
relying	only	on	past	knowledge,	cardinal	points,	and	the	occasional	land	marker.
4.	 We	should	remember	that	human	rights	discourse	in	Western	countries	has	been	shaped	by	
decades	 of	 cold	war	 ideology,	 according	 to	which	 people	 coming	 from	 “friendly”	 nations	
(such	as	San	Salvador	or	Haiti)	were	considered	“economic	migrants,”	whereas	people	com-
ing	 out	 of	 “communist”	 countries	 (such	 as	Cuba	or	 the	Soviet	Union)	were	 automatically	
considered	“refugees.”
5.	 Whoever	compiled	the	Italian	script	for	deposing	asylum	seekers	failed	to	consider	the	com-
municative	 implications	of	asking	asylum	seekers	at the end of	 the	hearing	a	hypothetical	
question	about	what	they	had	to	fear	if	they	were	to	return	to	their	country.	I	witnessed	in	more	
than	one	occasion	the	panic	in	their	eyes,	convinced	that	they	had	failed	the	hearing	and	were	
going	to	be	sent	back.	The	sequential	power	of	the	script	had	struck	again.
6.	 I	wish	to	thank	Celso	Alvarez	Caccamo,	professor	of	Linguistics	at	the	University	of	A	Co-
runha,	Spain,	and	fellow	participant	in	many	of	Gumperz’s	seminars	at	UC	Berkeley,	for	his	
help	with	this	phonetic	analysis.	He	also	pointed	out	that,	psychologically,	the	asylum	seeker’s	
trauma	about	his	père	might	have	been	a	factor	in	his	decision	to	solve	this	perceptual	puzzle	
along	kinship	lines	instead	of	fear	of	persecution.
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